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OPINION 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 The United States appeals the district court‟s refusal to inform 
a jury about a stipulation that was entered into with defense counsel.  
The government also petitions this court for a writ of mandamus 
directing the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania to properly instruct a jury on the elements of the crime 
of illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), that was charged in this case.  Although 
mandamus is an exceptional remedy, we conclude that the troubling 
circumstances of this case require granting the writ to correct the 
trial court‟s continuing abuse of discretion in failing to inform the 
jury of the elements of the charged offense.  Accordingly, we will 
grant the petition and remand the case for trial.  We also find that we 
have jurisdiction to review the court‟s refusal to inform the jury 
about the stipulation.  Given the district court‟s conduct in this case, 
we feel that we have no alternative but to direct the Chief Judge of 
the District Court to reassign this matter to a different judge on 
remand. 
 
I. Factual Background 
  Joemon D. Higden, a previously convicted felon, was 
indicted for possessing a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
1
  The matter was assigned on 
                                              
1
 Higden‟s last name has been spelled in the record as Higdon 
as well as Higdom.  We adopt the spelling that Higden used 
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July 20, 2010 to United States District Court Judge John P. Fullam, a 
very experienced and hard working senior judge.   
 
At trial, the government called Lisa Walker, who testified that 
Higden came to her home on the night in question with a gun, and 
that she called the police after Higden fired the gun in the street.  
Two police officers responded to the call.  The officers testified that 
they observed Higden crouched over on the street.  They also said 
that they heard a clanking noise, and later found a gun in the same 
area where Higden had been. 
 
Prior to trial, Higden stipulated that he had been previously 
convicted of a felony and that the gun the police retrieved in this 
case had traveled in interstate commerce.  Higden did not initially 
object to introducing the stipulations at trial.  They included the 
following: 
 The firearm listed in the 
Indictment – a 9mm Taurus semi-
automatic handgun, Model 
PT92AFS, serial number 
TAR1146, loaded with 14 rounds 
of 9mm ammunition – has been 
test-fired, is operable, and is a 
“firearm” as defined within Title 
18, United States Code, Sections 
922(g)(1) and 924(e). 
 
* * * 
 
 The firearm listed in the 
Indictment - a 9mm Taurus semi-
automatic handgun, Model 
PT92AFS, serial number 
TAR1146, loaded with 14 rounds 
of 9mm ammunition – was 
manufactured outside of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
and was therefore “in or affecting 
[interstate] commerce” within the 
meaning of Title 18, United States 
                                                                                                     
in his brief as well as that which his counsel used during the 
voir dire.  See App. 27.   
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Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 
924(e) on or about September 20, 
2009. 
 
* * * 
 
 Prior to September 20, 2009, 
defendant Joemon D. Higd[e]n 
had been convicted in a court of 
the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania of a felony crime, 
punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, within 
the meaning of Title 18 United 
States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) 
and 924(e). 
 
App. 20–22.  
 
Despite both parties agreeing that the jury would be informed 
about these stipulations, the district court did not permit the 
government to mention them to the jury.  Rather, during voir dire, 
the judge only told the potential jurors: 
 
Now the charge brought by the 
Government is that the defendant, 
Mr. Higd[e]n, had possession of a 
firearm which it was illegal for 
him to possess in those 
circumstances . . . . The charge is 
that the defendant was not legally 
permitted to have possession of a 
firearm, and the Government says 
on a particular occasion he did 
have possession of a firearm.   
 
App. 27-28.  
 
The Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) prosecuting 
the case repeatedly objected to the district court‟s refusal to inform 
the jury of the relevant charge.   
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On the first day of trial, the AUSA asked Judge Fullam in 
chambers whether he could refer to the prior felony conviction in his 
opening statement.  The AUSA apparently made that request 
because Judge Fullam described Higden‟s offense to the potential 
jurors as simply “possession of a firearm which [] was illegal for 
him to possess in those circumstances,” App. 27, without mentioning 
the other two elements of § 922(g)(1).  Judge Fullam denied the 
request and told the prosecutor that Higden‟s stipulation about his 
prior conviction would not be sent to the jury.   
 
The following morning, the judge held another conference in 
chambers at the prosecutor‟s request.  The AUSA again asked if he 
could inform the jurors of the elements of the charged offense, and 
cited precedent of this court.  The AUSA argued that, at a minimum, 
the court should colloquy the defendant to ensure that he had agreed 
to waive his right to have all of the elements of § 922(g) established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.  The court denied 
both requests.   
 
After returning to the courtroom, the court reiterated that the 
stipulation regarding Higden‟s prior convictions would not be 
provided to the jury “in spite of the Government‟s position.” App. 
126.  The court then cut off the prosecutor‟s attempts to make a 
record, asking the AUSA: “Are you getting paid by the day or 
what[?]”  App. 127.  The prosecutor then requested a brief stay to 
consult with superiors in his office about the possibility of filing a 
petition for mandamus.  App. 124.  The court refused and chided the 
prosecutor, stating: “You go right ahead, but you‟re not going to get 
a stay.  You‟re expected to act like human beings.”  App. 124.   
 
As promised, during the trial, the court refused to permit the 
government to inform the jury of any of the stipulations.  Thus, the 
jury was not informed that the defendant had a prior felony 
conviction, nor was the government allowed to present evidence to 
establish that the firearm had travelled in interstate commerce – two 
of the three elements that the government had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convict Higden of violating § 922(g). 
  
At the conclusion of the trial, before the court instructed the 
jury, the prosecutor reiterated his request that the court colloquy the 
defendant about the effect of the stipulations.  The prosecutor asked 
for “a very brief colloquy that [the defendant] understands that he 
agrees to give up his right to have the jury decide the other two 
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elements.”  App. 158.  The court denied the request, explaining 
“[b]ecause he‟s agreed – defendant has already agreed to those.  
We‟ve been over this enough.  Please be seated.  You‟re wasting our 
time.”  App. 158.   
 
 In the parties‟ proposed jury instructions, both Higden and the 
government agreed that the jury should be instructed on all of the 
elements of the offense.  The language that the attorneys agreed to 
largely tracked the Third Circuit model jury instructions, which 
addresses all of the elements of § 922(g)(1).
2
   However, the 
instruction that the court actually gave deviated significantly from 
the model instructions, and consisted mostly of boilerplate language 
pertaining to the definition of “evidence,”  the presumption of 
innocence, and reasonable doubt.  The court‟s entire instruction on § 
922(g)(1) was as follows:  
 
The issue in this case, as you 
know by now, is does the 
evidence establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Mr. Higd[e]n, had 
possession of this firearm at the 
time in question, namely, last 
September 20, 2009. 
 
* * *  
I‟m sure that when you carefully 
consider the evidence and the 
arguments of counsel that are 
based on that evidence, you will 
have little difficulty in 
understanding that your job is to 
                                              
2
 The Third Circuit‟s model jury instruction regarding a 
stipulation is as follows: 
   
“The Government and the defendant(s) have agreed that (set 
forth stipulated fact(s)) (is)(are) true.  You should therefore 
treat (this fact)(these facts) as having been proved.  You are 
not required to do so, however, since you are the sole judge of 
the facts.” 
 
Model Third Circuit Crim. Jury Instruction 4.02.   
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decide whether the evidence 
which was actually presented does 
or does not establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the 
defendant, Mr. Higd[e]n, had 
possession of this firearm, that he 
knew he had possession and knew 
it was a firearm.   
 
App. 203-04.   Thus, not only did the court fail to inform the jury of 
the fact of a prior felony and the need to find that the gun travelled in 
interstate commerce, which were two of the three elements of the 
charged offense, but the court also offered no instruction on the 
meaning of “possession.”3  
 
After nearly a day of deliberation, the jury pronounced that it 
was deadlocked.  App. 229.   Judge Fullam responded by taking the 
highly unusual step of proposing the following: “[A]ssuming that the 
jury is somewhat evenly divided, would there be any consideration 
in accepting a majority vote for the jury?”  App. 227.  The 
government rejected the idea and reminded the court that a criminal 
jury‟s verdict must be unanimous.  App. 228.   Defense counsel 
stated that he “could not in good conscience” agree to the court‟s 
suggestion without knowing the vote.  App. 227-28.  The court 
responded by telling the attorneys that “both sides are entitled to the 
same information,” but noting: “[s]o far you‟ve been informed that 
it‟s fairly even.” 4  App. 227.  Afterwards, the court informed the 
                                              
3
   “Possession” is clearly a common term and it may not, at 
first, appear to require definition.  However, that is not the 
case when a defendant is charged with a possessory offense, 
especially where, as here, the contraband was not found on 
his person.  Thus, the term should have been explained to the 
jury.  See United States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  
 
4
  The court added: “I don‟t propose to let you know what the 
ultimate outcome would be by a majority vote. I don‟t think 
that‟s fair to either side, unless – unless you want it. I don‟t 
know.”  App. 227.  When neither attorney responded, the 
court observed: “I hear a deafening silence.” App. 228.  
Defense counsel finally told the court that he “did not have 
the guts . . . to recommend that to [his] client[;]” and the court 
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parties that the vote was 7 in favor of guilty and 5 in favor of not 
guilty.   The court scheduled a second trial for September 27, 2010, 
pointing out that it would “retry it at vast expense and effort.”  App. 
228.   
 
 In advance of the scheduled retrial, the government filed a 
motion in limine on September 15, 2010, in which it moved: (1) that 
the court advise the jury at the outset that the charge in this case is 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) that the government be permitted to present 
to the jury evidence and argument regarding each of the elements of 
the § 922(g)(1) offense, including stipulations regarding two of the 
elements; and (3) that the court instruct the jury at the conclusion of 
the trial regarding each of the elements of the offense.  App. 236-57.  
Although Higden had originally agreed with the government that the 
jury should be instructed about the stipulations, he now opposed the 
government‟s motion arguing that the government sought to 
prejudice his case.  App. 259-62.   
 
 The district court denied the motion in limine.  In doing so, 
Judge Fullam explained that at the first trial, he followed his “normal 
procedure,” App. 7, of informing the jury that the defendant was not 
lawfully permitted to have possession of a firearm on the occasion in 
question, and that he intended to follow this practice at the second 
trial as well.
5
  Judge Fullam asserted that the “only conceivable 
purpose,” App. 7-8, for the government‟s desire to inform the jury 
                                                                                                     
asked the AUSA: “[i]s the government counsel any more 
courageous?”  App. 228.   
 
5
 Judge Fullam has adopted this practice in at least two other 
cases.  In United States v. Harold Brunson, No. 10-4039, 
2011 WL 758839 (3d Cir. Mar. 3, 2011), Judge Fullam 
denied the government‟s motion in limine to instruct the jury 
about all of the elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense.  The 
government filed an appeal and petition for writ of 
mandamus, which has been granted.    In United States v. 
Darrell Bell, No. 10-454 (E.D. Pa.), in the wake of the 
Higden case, the government filed a motion in limine 
requesting that the court advise the jury regarding each 
element of the § 922(g)(1) offense.  Judge Fullam entered an 
order continuing the case pending our decision in the present 
appeal.   
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about the felony conviction would be to prejudice Higden.  Rather 
than proceed with the trial, the government filed this appeal and 
petitioned for mandamus.  
 
 Higden subsequently filed a motion to bifurcate the evidence.   
App. 271-72.  He asked that the jury be informed of the prior 
conviction if, and only if, it first concluded that he possessed the 
firearm in question.  The government filed a response opposing the 
motion and the district court stayed the case because the 
government‟s appeal was pending.  App. 276-81.  
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
 The district court‟s decision regarding the admissibility of 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).  We apply the same 
standard in reviewing a district court's determination that the risk of 
unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value 
of otherwise admissible evidence.  See United States v. Mathis, 264 
F.3d 321, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A.  Jurisdiction 
 
 The Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, governs when 
the government can take an interlocutory appeal.  Higden maintains 
that this appeal falls outside of the permission granted in that Act 
and that we therefore lack jurisdiction.  Section 3731 provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
 An appeal by the United States 
shall lie to a court of appeals from 
a decision or order of a district 
court suppressing or excluding 
evidence or requiring the return of 
seized property in a criminal 
proceeding, not made after the 
defendant has been put in 
jeopardy and before the verdict or 
finding on an indictment or 
information, if the United States 
attorney certifies to the district 
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court that the appeal is not taken 
for purpose of delay and that the 
evidence is substantial proof of a 
fact material in the proceeding.  
 
 Higden argues that jurisdiction does not lie under § 3731 
because the district court neither suppressed nor excluded any 
evidence.   However, the Supreme Court has explained that the 
legislative history of § 3731 “makes it clear that Congress intended 
to remove all statutory barriers to [g]overnment appeals and to allow 
appeals whenever the Constitution would permit.”  United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975).  This is consistent with the 
language of the statute itself, which states that “[t]he provisions of 
this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”  
18 U.S.C. § 3731.   
 
Here, the court refused to introduce stipulations regarding 
Higden‟s prior felony and the fact that the firearm had traveled in 
interstate commerce.  The court then denied the government‟s 
motion to introduce evidence about the stipulated facts at the retrial.  
The court‟s order constituted an evidentiary ruling that effectively 
suppressed proof of the facts set forth in the stipulation including 
evidence of Higden‟s prior conviction. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that § 3731 confers appellate 
jurisdiction to review the district court‟s order prohibiting the 
stipulation being admitted into evidence.  See United States v. 
Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 521 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Section 3731 was 
designed to allow appeals from [district court orders] to insure that 
prosecutions are not unduly restricted by erroneous pre-trial 
decisions to exclude evidence.”).   
 
However, § 3731 does not allow us to exercise jurisdiction 
over the district court‟s refusal to properly charge the elements of the 
offense for which Higden was on trial.  That ruling did not suppress 
or exclude evidence.  Rather, it prohibited the jury from learning the 
definition of the crime with which Higden was charged.  We know 
of no authority that would allow us to stretch the parameters of § 
3731 far enough to cover a court‟s refusal to inform the jury of the 
elements of the crime(s) with which the defendant is charged. 
 
Nevertheless, that does not end our jurisdictional inquiry 
because the government claims that the court‟s refusal to properly 
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charge a jury is appropriate for mandamus relief pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1651.  Higden contends that we lack jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of mandamus because the district court did not exceed the 
lawful exercise of its discretion.  However, as we will explain, we 
believe that this case is precisely the sort of “extraordinary” situation 
where a writ of mandamus is warranted.  Kerr v. United States Dist. 
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521, 524 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 
B.  The Stipulation 
 
 In order to establish a violation of § 922(g)(1), the 
government must establish each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  (1) the defendant has been convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) the 
defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; and (3) the firearm had 
travelled in interstate commerce.  United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 
340, 344 (3d. Cir. 2000).   Here, the court only informed the jury 
about the second element – whether Higden had possessed the gun 
the government introduced into evidence.   
 
 We have previously rejected the idea that a defendant‟s 
stipulation to an element of an offense removes that element entirely 
from the jury‟s consideration.  In United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 
735 (3d Cir. 1979), the defendant agreed to stipulate to his prior 
conviction and asked the district court to preclude the government 
from referring to his status as a convicted felon.   Id. at 740.   
However, the government refused to join the tendered stipulation, 
and the district court did not require the government to do so.  Id.  
Rather, the government introduced evidence of the prior conviction 
and the defendant subsequently appealed his conviction.  On appeal, 
we summarized the issue regarding the proposed stipulation as 
follows:  
 
 Counsel for the appellant offered 
in effect to modify the statute by 
stipulating that the appellant was 
a convicted felon and to preclude 
thereby any mention to the jury of 
the appellant's felony status either 
by argument of counsel for the 
government or through 
instructions to the jury by the 
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court on the elements of the 
crime. Counsel for government 
refused to join in such a 
stipulation, and the court refused 
to require the government so to 
do. 
 
Id.  We held that “[t]he court did not err.”  Id.  We explained that 
“we perceive no authority for counsel or the court to modify a 
criminal statute enacted by Congress by eliminating through 
stipulation one of the elements of the crime.”  Id.  We further noted 
that even if the stipulation “did not go so far as to constitute the 
modification of a criminal statute, „[t]he Government was not 
required to accept a judicial admission . . . of the defendant but had a 
right to proffer proof on the point admitted.‟”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 1970)) (ellipsis in 
original).  
 
 Our holding in Williams is consistent with the Supreme 
Court‟s recognition that the protections of the Sixth Amendment 
entitle every criminal defendant to “a jury determination that [he] is 
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
477 (2000).   The constitutional right to trial by jury has, “as its most 
important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, 
reach the requisite finding of „guilty.‟”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 277 (1993).  That fundamental component of a jury trial 
cannot be negated or abridged by stipulation.  Therefore, although a 
stipulation may provide a mechanism for proving facts that 
constitute an element of an offense, it cannot prevent a jury from 
performing its role as the ultimate finder of fact as to all those facts 
required to prove the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
 
 Every court of appeals that has addressed the issue before us 
has reached the same conclusion.  In United States v. Gilliam, 994 
F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that removing an element from the jury‟s consideration 
upon a stipulation would offend the function of the jury.  The court 
explained that “[w]ithout full knowledge of the nature of the crime, 
the jury cannot speak for the people or exert their authority.”  Id. at 
101.  Indeed, the court emphasized that removing an element of the 
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crime from the jury‟s consideration “violates the very foundation of 
the jury system.”  Id. at 100.   
  
 Similarly, in United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 
1995), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
removing the prior felony element of the § 922(g)(1) offense from 
the jury‟s consideration “prevents the government from having its 
case decided by the jury, and changes the very nature of the charged 
crime.”  Accordingly, the court held that the district court must 
instruct the jury of all the elements of the crime charged.  Id.; see 
also United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1993), 
amended, 20 F.3d 365, 366 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 482 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 27-29 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. 
Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1977).   
 
 Higden counters by arguing that none of these cases are 
relevant because they pre-date the Supreme Court‟s decision in Old 
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), which Higden contends 
is directly on point.   There, as here, the defendant was a convicted 
felon who had been charged with possession of a firearm in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Id. at 175.  The defendant stipulated to the 
prior felony and moved for an order to prevent the government from 
presenting evidence of his prior offense because of its likelihood to 
prejudice the jury.  Id.  The district court denied the order and the 
court of appeals affirmed, finding that the government was entitled 
to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense, regardless 
of the defendant‟s stipulation offer.  Id. at 177.  The Supreme Court 
reversed.  Id. at 192. 
 
 The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by 
spurning the defendant‟s offer to stipulate to the prior offense 
because the admissibility of the evidence would be prejudicial to the 
defendant.  Id. at 174.  The Court was sensitive to the specific 
problem raised by § 922(g)(1) and the prior felony conviction 
element.  The Court explained that “there can be no question that 
evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries 
a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”  Id. at 185.  Therefore, 
the Court reasoned that the trial court should have accepted the 
stipulation because “[the defendant‟s] proffered admission . . . 
presents the District Court with alternative, relevant, admissible and 
14 
 
seemingly conclusive evidence of the prior conviction,”  Id. at 186, 
that would allay the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.     
 
 However, Old Chief does not stand for the proposition that 
evidence of a defendant‟s prior conviction is not admissible when a 
defendant offers to stipulate to the conviction.  Rather, the Court 
held only that the “name or general character of that crime” need not 
be disclosed because “the fact of the qualifying conviction is alone 
what matters under the statute.”  Id. at 190.   In fact, the Court 
anticipated that a jury would be informed of the stipulation about a 
defendant‟s prior conviction.  The Court explained that:  “the most 
the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the 
defendant falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought 
should bar a convict from possession of a gun, and this point may be 
made readily in a defendant‟s admission and underscored in the 
court‟s jury instructions.”  Id. at 190-91.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
did not hold, as Higden contends, that the jury need not be informed 
of the fact of a prior conviction when that prior conviction is an 
element of the charged offense.  On the contrary, the Court affirmed 
that the jury must still be made aware of the existence of a 
defendant‟s prior conviction.6 
                                              
6
  Higden also cites to United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 
471 (10th Cir. 1996) in support of his position that a jury 
should not be informed of a defendant‟s prior conviction, 
even if it is an element of the charged offense.  In Mason, the 
defendant was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the 
parties stipulated to the prior felony conviction and interstate 
commerce elements of the offense.  Id. at 471-72.  The 
district court then instructed that because the parties 
stipulated to these elements, “the government need not offer 
proof as to these elements, and you should consider them 
proven by the government.”  Id. at 472.   
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court 
erred by withholding the stipulated elements from the jury's 
consideration.  Finding no error in the district court's jury 
instructions, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
reasoned that “the jury need not resolve the existence of an 
element when the parties have stipulated to the facts which 
establish that element . . . the judge has not removed the 
consideration of an issue from the jury; the parties have.”  Id.  
Higden‟s reliance on this case is wholly misplaced because 
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 Our analysis of Old Chief is consistent with other post-Old 
Chief decisions, which conclude that a district court may not entirely 
exclude a stipulated fact from the jury‟s consideration when that fact 
constitutes an element of an offense.  In United States v. Chevere, 
368 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2004), the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that in a prosecution under § 922(g)(1), there are 
“no circumstances” where a district court may remove the element 
of a prior felony conviction entirely from the jury‟s consideration by 
accepting a defendant‟s stipulation to that element.  Consistent with 
the holding in Old Chief, the court explained that “[a]lthough a 
defendant may, by stipulating that he has a prior felony conviction, 
prevent the jury from hearing the nature or underlying facts of the 
conviction, he may not prevent the jury from learning the fact that he 
has a prior felony conviction – a ‘crucial element’ of the offense.”  
Id. at 121 (emphasis in original).    Similarly, in United States v. 
Amante, 418 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2005), the court quoted heavily from 
its earlier opinion in Gilliam, 994 F.2d 100, in finding that 
withholding an element of a crime from a jury‟s consideration places 
the jury “in a position only to make findings of fact on a particular 
element without knowing the true import of those findings.”  Id. at 
223.  The court reasoned that a defendant‟s “prior conviction is a 
„critical element‟ of § 922(g)(1) that cannot be divorced from the 
crime.”  Id.  
 
 Moreover, our reasoning here is informed not only by our 
own precedent and the persuasive reasoning of our sister circuit 
courts of appeals, but also by the practical implications of failing to 
instruct a jury about all elements of this offense.  Possession of a 
firearm is ordinarily not a crime, and the emotions and fervor 
surrounding efforts to restrict gun ownership are all too familiar to 
require citation.  Therefore, it is quite likely that a juror would be 
concerned about prosecuting someone merely for possessing a 
firearm, particularly if the juror is a gun owner.  Although no one 
other than the people on Higden‟s first jury can know why it 
deadlocked, common sense suggests that it may well have been 
                                                                                                     
the Tenth Circuit never found that the district court could 
refuse to inform the jury of the prior conviction or the 
elements that make up the charged offense.  On the contrary, 
the district court judge explicitly advised the jury of the 
elements of § 922(g)(1), including the prior felony element, 
and the Tenth Circuit found no error in that instruction.  Id. at 
471.   
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because of concerns about convicting someone for simply 
possessing a gun.  The fact that the first trial resulted in a hung jury 
also suggests that at least some of the jurors may have been confused 
about why Higden was on trial in the first place.  See Old Chief, 519 
U.S. at 189 (“People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of 
abstraction may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked 
to rest a momentous decision on the story's truth can feel put upon at 
being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said 
than they have heard.”).  Furthermore, the district court‟s jury 
instructions were so cursory that it is entirely possible that the jury 
surmised that Higden had been charged with an entirely different 
offense altogether.  For example, it is a federal crime for an illegal 
alien to possess a gun.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). 
 
 In addition, failing to instruct the jury about the prior felony 
element of the § 922(g)(1) offense would have the impermissible 
effect of allowing the district court to modify a congressionally 
enacted criminal statute by eliminating an element of the crime 
through stipulation.  It is also contrary to fundamental concepts of a 
jury trial.  See United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“[O]mission of an essential element of an offense [in a jury 
instruction] ordinarily constitutes plain error.‟”) (quoting United 
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in 
original); United States v. Cornish, 103 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(finding that the jury should be informed about a stipulated element); 
Williams, 612 F.2d at 740 (rejecting the appellant‟s proffered 
stipulation on grounds that it would modify a criminal statute).    
 
 We, of course, realize the danger of undue prejudice inherent 
in any attempt to inform a jury that a defendant has a prior criminal 
conviction.  Such evidence can certainly create bias that could 
increase the likelihood of a conviction on something other than 
evidence.  We have previously recognized that a government‟s 
proffered reasons “to admit prior bad act evidence may often be [a] 
Potemkin [Village], because the motive, we suspect, is often mixed 
between an urge to show some other consequential fact as well as to 
impugn the defendant's character.”  United States v. Sampson, 980 
F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, however, Higden‟s prior 
conviction is not merely a consequential fact, it is an element of the 
crime charged.  Thus, any prejudice results from the requirements of 
17 
 
the statute itself,  and is best addressed by an appropriately forceful 
limiting instruction.
7
 
 
 Nevertheless,  we are not so naïve as to believe that a curative 
instruction will always vitiate all possibility of prejudice in every 
case.  It will, however, help to balance the district court‟s obligation 
to inform the jury about the charge at issue on the one hand, and the 
defendant‟s right to a fair trial by an unbiased fact finder on the 
other.  See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41(1993) 
(noting the presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions); 
United States v. Liburd, 607 F.3d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hile 
curative instructions cannot repair every error, we do generally 
presume that juries follow their instructions.”); Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 
100 (“But where the district court issues a proper curative 
instruction, we must presume that a conscientious jury will only use 
the proof of the prior conviction to satisfy the element of the 
crime.”). 
 
                                              
7
    We agree that courts must diligently attempt to prevent 
the kind of prejudice that “clouds impartial scrutiny and 
reasoned evaluation of the facts,”  United States v. Starnes, 
583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009), by ensuring that 
prosecutors do not attempt to exploit the defendant‟s record.  
Thus, at the very least, forceful and carefully tailored curative 
instructions will almost always be required. 
 
For example, see Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 99, in which the 
Second Circuit cited with approval the district court‟s limiting 
instructions with respect to a § 922(g) offense:   
 
Now, I want to firmly instruct you in this connection 
that the prior conviction that is an element of the 
charge here and is not disputed, is only to be 
considered by you for the fact that it exists. And for 
nothing else. You are not to consider it for any other 
purpose, you are not to speculate as to what it was for 
or anything else. It is not to be in any way considered 
by you on whether it is more likely than not that the 
defendant was in knowing possession of the gun that is 
charged, which is the disputed element of the offense 
here charged. 
18 
 
 In addition, Higden‟s claim of undue prejudice here is further 
undermined by the fact that evidence of a defendant‟s prior bad act 
can be admitted as proof of motive, intent, knowledge, or any 
number of other factors under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).  United States v. 
Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988)).   It is true that evidence 
of prior bad acts is excluded under Rule 404(b) when it involves 
“other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”  Rule 404(b) (emphasis added).  
However, Higden‟s prior conviction proves an element of the 
charged offense and is therefore not evidence of some “other” crime.   
 
C.  Bifurcation of the Trial 
 
As an alternative to the procedure that the district court 
adopted in Higden‟s first trial, Higden contends that we should 
approve a bifurcated second trial.  Under the proposed bifurcated 
procedure, the jury would learn about the prior conviction only after 
determining whether Higden was in possession of a firearm.  In his 
motion to bifurcate, Higden contends that bifurcation “would allow 
the government to present evidence regarding all elements of the 
offense without predisposing the jury to resolve the element of 
possession against Defendant on the basis of his prior record.”  App. 
271.  In other words, Higden asserts that a bifurcated procedure 
would help mitigate any undue prejudice that would arise by the jury 
knowing of his prior conviction at the outset of the trial.  
 
The district court did not rule on Higden‟s motion to bifurcate 
the evidence because it stayed the case on the basis of the 
government‟s appeal.  Therefore, the bifurcation issue is not before 
us.  We will note, however, that we have rejected a bifurcated 
procedure under similar circumstances.  See United States v. Jacobs, 
44 F.3d 1219, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). 
8
 
                                              
8
        In Jacobs, we held that the trial court was not permitted 
to sever the trial of a single § 922(g) offense to prevent the 
jury from learning of a defendant‟s prior felony conviction 
until it resolved other elements.  We reasoned that bifurcation 
would deprive the jury of knowledge of the very crime with 
which the defendant was charged, which was an untenable 
result.  Id.  Since our decision in Jacobs, every appellate court 
that has addressed whether a single count indictment under § 
922(g)(1) should be entitled to a bifurcated trial has rejected 
the idea.  See Amante, 418 F.3d at 225; United States v. 
Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 866-68 (D.C. 1999); United States v. 
19 
 
 
D.  Writ of Mandamus as a Remedy 
 
 The All Writs Act gives appellate courts the power to issue a 
writ of mandamus “in exceptional cases where the traditional bases 
for jurisdiction do not apply.”  In re Pasquariello, 16 F.3d 525, 528 
(3d Cir. 1994).  The Act states that “[t]he Supreme Court and all 
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to 
the usages and principles of law.”  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).  
Traditionally, the writ of mandamus has been used “to confine an 
inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to 
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”  Will 
v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978).  The writ is a 
drastic remedy that “is seldom issued and its use is discouraged.” 
Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).   
 
 Nevertheless, the need for a writ of mandamus is “obvious” in 
certain very rare circumstances.  Blasband v. Rales, 979 F.2d 324, 
328 (3d Cir. 1992).  “For example, mandamus is appropriate when a 
district court has failed to adhere to the mandate of an appellate 
court.”  In re Chambers Development Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 224 
(3d Cir. 1998); see also Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 903 F.2d 234, 
237 (3d Cir. 1990).   
                                                                                                     
Koskela, 86 F.3d 122, 125 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Dean, 76 F.3d 329, 332 (10th Cir. 1996); Milton, 52 F.3d at 
80-81; Birdsong, 982 F.2d at 482; Barker, 1 F.3d at 959; 
Collamore, 868 F.2d at 28.  As we explained in Jacobs, 
bifurcation under these circumstances puts the jury in the 
difficult position of deciding the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant without knowing all of the elements of the crime 
that is charged.  Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 1222.   
 
This does not, however, mean that other appropriate 
steps cannot be taken to minimize the danger of undue 
prejudice that could almost certainly result from the jury 
learning of the defendant‟s prior felony conviction.  Indeed, 
courts should attempt to minimize and mitigate that danger, 
but they must do so in ways that are appropriate, consistent 
with precedent, and do not deprive the jury of the information 
it needs to appropriately determine the defendant‟s guilt for 
the charged offense.  
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 In order for a court to issue the writ, (1) the petitioner must 
have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and (2) the 
petitioner must meet its burden of showing that its right to the writ is 
clear and indisputable.  Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 
380-81 (2004).  Even when these prerequisites are met, however, the 
issuance of a writ is “largely discretionary.”  Hahnemann Univ. 
Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
 We find that both elements have been met here.  First, it is 
crystal clear that the government has “no other adequate means” of 
compelling the district court to instruct the jury of all elements of the 
§ 922(g) offense.  As noted above, the prosecutor repeatedly asked 
the district court, both in conferences held in chambers as well as in 
the courtroom, to inform the jury of the relevant charge.  The 
prosecutor also requested on two occasions that the court colloquy 
Higden to confirm that he agreed to waive his right to have all of the 
elements of the crime found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
9
   
The court denied these requests.   The prosecutor then asked for a 
stay to permit consultation with his superiors regarding the 
possibility of filing a petition for mandamus.  That request was 
similarly denied.  The government then filed a motion in limine 
requesting the district court to properly instruct the jury about each 
of the elements of § 922(g)(1) at the conclusion of the trial.  That 
request was also denied by the district court.  The government thus 
exhausted all possible options, and was left with no alternative but to 
allow the retrial to proceed under the same circumstances as the first 
trial, or to seek relief by writ of mandamus.    
 
 The second requirement for mandamus relief is also satisfied 
here.  The court‟s insistence on giving an improper jury charge 
constitutes “clear and indisputable” error, Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381, 
especially given the district court judge‟s stated intention of 
repeating his “usual practice” at the retrial.  App. 7-8.  We have 
recognized that “the adoption of a clearly erroneous jury instruction 
                                              
9
 This request was apparently based upon the AUSA‟s 
awareness that allowing the case to be submitted to the jury 
based only upon the stipulation to two elements without 
requiring (or allowing) any proof of those elements would be 
tantamount to waiving the defendant‟s constitutional right to 
a jury trial as to the two elements that were the subject of the 
stipulations. 
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that entails a high probability of failure of a prosecution – a failure 
the government could not then seek to remedy by appeal or 
otherwise – constitutes the kind of extraordinary situation in which 
we are empowered to issue the writ of mandamus.”  United States v. 
Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
 This is such an extraordinary situation.  The district court 
refused to abide by controlling precedent that a jury must be 
instructed about all of the elements of an offense.  The precedent is 
not only clear, but is fundamental to the jury system.  In addition, the 
court‟s conduct placed the government in a very precarious situation.  
On one hand, any conviction based on the flawed jury instruction the 
court insisted on giving would almost surely have been reversed, 
thereby subjecting the defendant to another retrial.  On the other 
hand, an acquittal after a flawed jury instruction would leave the 
government with no ability to appeal because the protections of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause would apply.  See Wexler, 31 F.3d at 128.   
 
 The situation is especially problematic here because, as we 
noted above, possession of a firearm is not a crime under ordinary 
circumstances, and it is now clear that an individual has a 
constitutional right to possess a gun.  See District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the District of 
Columbia‟s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the 
Second Amendment, as there is an individual right to gun 
ownership).  A juror who is asked to convict someone merely for 
possessing a gun under “these circumstances,” App. 27, with no 
explanation about the “circumstances” that make possession a crime, 
could well be both confused by the charges and reluctant to convict 
for conduct that s/he knows is not ordinarily criminal.   It is hard to 
believe that some jurors would have been anything other than 
puzzled as well as distrustful given the erroneous and incomplete 
jury charge here.   
 
 We are also deeply troubled that the district court would even 
entertain the notion of accepting a majority vote from the jury, in 
clear violation of a defendant‟s constitutional right to a unanimous 
jury verdict in a federal criminal trial.  See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3035 n.14 (2010) (explaining that the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury 
verdict in federal criminal cases); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 
455, 461 (3d Cir. 1987) (“[J]ust as the [S]ixth [A]mendment requires 
jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense 
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that it finds a defendant culpable, it must also require unanimity 
regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense.” 
(internal citation omitted)) .
10
  Accordingly, we affirmatively 
exercise our discretion and conclude that the circumstances here 
merit mandamus relief.  See Amante, 418 F.3d 220.  In granting 
mandamus relief, we are aware that another panel of this Court has 
now decided the case of United States v. Harold Brunson.  See note 
6, supra.
11
  There, as here, the same district court judge refused to 
follow the precedent of this circuit and instead insisted upon 
conducting a trial according to his own personal view of the law and 
his own custom.                
 
The resulting situation is as unfortunate as it is regrettable.  
We noted at the outset that Judge Fullam is a very experienced and 
hard working jurist and he has devoted decades of service to the 
federal bench.  Nothing we have said in this opinion should detract 
from that.  However, neither this court, nor any other court, can 
tolerate a situation where a judge decides to follow his/her own 
custom and concepts of justice rather than the precedent of the 
applicable appellate court or the United States Supreme Court.  Ours 
is a nation of laws, not judges.  
 
 In granting relief, we have acknowledged that human frailties 
may well predispose jurors against a defendant charged with 
violating § 922 and result in a conviction based primarily upon a 
                                              
10
  Indeed, the district court judge‟s suggestion that defense 
counsel and the AUSA consider agreeing to decide the 
outcome by a majority vote of a closely divided jury is so 
bizarre that it is tempting to assume that the court was simply 
joking. However, the judge did nothing to correct the 
impression that he was serious and neither side interpreted the 
court‟s overture as anything other than a serious suggestion.  
Both attorneys responded as if the court was serious and 
nothing suggests that they were mistaken in doing so.   
 
11
  Brunson is a nonprecedential opinion.  However, we do 
not refer to it here by way of authority.  Rather, our reference 
is only intended to provide the context of this appeal and 
mandamus petition.  Moreover, given the conclusion of the 
unanimous panel in Brunson, it is clear that this case must be 
assigned to a different judge on remand. 
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prior criminal record even where the evidence might not otherwise 
support a conviction.  Nonetheless, we cannot accept a situation of a 
judge taking it upon himself/herself to mitigate prejudice in a 
manner that undermines the very laws the judge has taken an oath to 
uphold and defend.    
 
 Nor can all that happened here be dismissed as the result of 
the court‟s concern for ensuring that Higden received a fair trial.  We 
can think of few procedures that would be more prejudicial to a 
defendant‟s constitutional rights, nor more inimical to the concept of 
a right to a jury trial embodied in the Sixth Amendment, than the 
court‟s suggestion that this case be decided by a majority vote of a 
closely divided jury. We are therefore simply at a loss to understand 
the court‟s behavior. 
 
 Finally, we are not convinced that the district court was 
justified in believing that the government‟s only intent in eliciting 
proof of Higden‟s prior conviction was to unduly prejudice him.  
Although that may sometimes be the case, nothing on this record 
suggests that the prosecutor here was concerned about anything 
other than informing the jury of the elements of the charged offense 
as defined by Congress when he asked to inform the jury of the 
existence of the prior felony conviction.
12
        
 
 In light of these unfortunate circumstances, we will grant the 
petition for mandamus.  We must also exercise our authority to 
direct the Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to 
reassign the case to another district court judge on remand.  See 
                                              
12
 We realize that there are certainly instances where the 
government may seek to admit a defendant‟s prior bad acts in 
an effort to prejudice the jury.  While referring to 
admissibility of prior bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), we 
have noted that there are “obvious dangers inherent in 
evidence of uncharged bad acts, and the adversarial tendency 
of the proponents of such evidence to be less than candid 
about their motives for offering evidence that suggests that a 
defendant's character is suspect.”  United States v. Morley, 
199 F.3d 129, 139 (3d Cir. 1999).  However, an examination 
of the record in this case makes clear that the prosecutor 
merely sought to make the jury aware of the elements of the 
charged offense.   
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Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“We are authorized to order the reassignment of this case to 
another district court judge pursuant either to the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1651(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 2106.”).  Although we recognize 
that “[t]he decision to remove a judge from an ongoing trial should 
be considered seriously and made only rarely,” Huber v. Taylor, 532 
F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2008), the district court‟s troubling actions in 
this case leave us with no alternative. 
   
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the writ of 
mandamus and remand for additional proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  In doing so, we will direct the Chief Judge of the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to assign this 
case to a different judge.
 
